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The  important  role  of  Operating  Experience  Feedback  is emphasised.
Events  relating  to cracks  and  leaks  in  the  reactor  coolant  pressure  boundary  are  analysed.
A  methodology  for  event  investigation  is described.
Some  illustrative  results  of the analysis  of  events  for  speciﬁc  components  are  presented.
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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  presence  of  cracks  and  leaks  in the  reactor  coolant  pressure  boundary  may  jeopardise  the  safe  oper-
ation of  nuclear  power  plants.  Analysis  of  cracks  and  leaks  related  events  is  an  important  task  for  the
prevention  of  their  recurrence,  which  should  be  performed  in the  context  of activities  on  Operating
Experience  Feedback.  In  response  to  this  concern,  the  EU  Clearinghouse  operated  by the  JRC-IET sup-
ports  and develops  technical  and  scientiﬁc  work  to  disseminate  the  lessons  learned  from  past  operating
experience.  In particular,  concerning  cracks  and  leaks,  the studies  carried  out in collaboration  with  IRSN
and GRS have  allowed  to identify  the  most  sensitive  areas  to degradation  in the plant  primary  system
and  to elaborate  recommendations  for upgrading  the  maintenance,  ageing  management  and  inspection
programmes.  An  overview  of  the  methodology  used  in the  analysis  of  cracks  and  leaks  related  events  is
presented  in this  paper,  together  with the  relevant  results  obtained  in the  study.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).. Introduction
The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB)
s important to safety because it forms one of the three defence-
n-depth barriers. For that reason the RCPB is designed and
anufactured so as to have an extremely low probability of
bnormal leakage, which can be caused by different degrada-
ion mechanisms as shown in Fig. 1. Components of the RCPB
re designed to permit periodic inspection and testing of impor-
ant areas and features to assess their structural integrity. Leak
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 224 565241; fax: +31 224 565637.
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ntonio.ballesteros.avila@gmail.com (A. Ballesteros).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2014.05.014
029-5493/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article udetection contributes to the prevention of reactor coolant system
(RCS) loop breaks by detecting any through-wall cracks that may
appear in service before they reach a critical size.
Evaluation of operating experience is a powerful tool for the
safety assessment of nuclear power plants (NPP) (Schulz, 1991;
Weil and Apostolakis, 2001; Michel, 2012). When applied to cracks
and leaks related events, the analysis aims to ﬁnd response to crit-
ical questions, such as:
• How relevant are the events, treated together, to their catego-
rization (design, plant status, component, event cause, etc.)?
• What conclusions can be drawn on the safety impact and the
corrective measures taken?
• What are the lessons learned for each category of event?
• What are the recommendations to prevent the repetition of such
events?
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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Fig. 1. Process leading to leakage.
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. European clearinghouse
The EU Clearinghouse on NPP Operational Experience Feedback
OEF) (Noël, 2010; Mühleisen, 2011), https://clearinghouse-oef.
rc.ec.europa.eu/, carries out on a regular basis technical work to
isseminate the lessons learned from past operating experience
s well as background scientiﬁc research in OEF. Additionally, the
U Clearinghouse is conducting work on exchange of OEF, as well
s collaborating with international organisations. The EU Clear-
nghouse is managed by the JRC of the European Commission
nd fosters the collection of operating experience from European
uclear regulators and/or operators, assessing the potential value
f lessons learned, and providing support for events relevant for the
lobal OEF to be reported systematically and in consistent manner
o the IRS system (IAEA, 2010) operated by NEA/IAEA.1One of the EU Clearinghouse tasks is to provide topical reports
f events with similar features or causes, conducting precursor
tudies of events at selected European NPPs facilitating the trend
1 NEA: Nuclear Energy agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
evelopment (OECD); IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.es in the EU Clearinghouse.
analyses and enabling better understanding of the main patterns
in operational experience events. Fig. 2 shows the organisations
involved in the EU Clearinghouse and their main deliverables.
This publication is based on the results of the topical study on
cracks and leaks related events performed by the JRC in collab-
oration with IRSN and GRS for the EU Clearinghouse. Other two
independent analyses conducted recently are on events involving
emergency diesel generators, see (Kancev and Duchac, 2013) and
NPP modiﬁcations, (Zerger, 2011; Zerger et al., 2013).
3. Methodology
Four different databases were used in this study. Namely, the
IAEA International Reporting System database IRS, the US Licensee
Events Reports database LER, the French (IRSN) database SAPIDE
and German (GRS) database KomPass. The screening period runs for
20 years, from 1991 to 2011 for IRS and LER, and from 1990 to 2010
for French and German databases. After screening, 145 IRS reports
and 75 LERs were found to be applicable, to which 129 French event
reports and 61 German event reports were added. The total number
of events considered is 409.
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To help identify generic recommendations, the events were
lassiﬁed into families and sub-families according to their safety
igniﬁcance. To evaluate the lessons learned the following approach
as applied:
1) Data preparation: extraction of the relevant information from
each database.
2) Categorization of the events according to previously agreed
families, such as design, plant status, component, sub-
component, event cause and type of detection.
3) Additional information on safety impact and corrective actions
were derived for the analysis.
4) Screening of the most relevant cracks and leaks events, classi-
ﬁed according to families.
5) Deriving lessons learned for each category of events.
6) Elaboration of recommendations to prevent the repetition of
such events.
The overall process is depicted in Fig. 3.
. Results
The event investigation was performed from different angles
by components, sub-components, degradation mechanisms, plant
onditions, etc.), and the study was very exhaustive. To limit the
ength of this publication below are presented only some illustra-
ive results classiﬁed by component type (pipes, vessel, pressuriser,
alves and ﬂanges).
.1. Piping
The pipes under pressure in the RCS or connected to RCS
re usually made of austenitic or austenitic & ferritic stainless
teel. Most connections are welded. The pipes may  be exposed
o various degradation phenomena (diverse hazards, mechanical
atigue, thermal fatigue, stress corrosion, etc.). Event screening in
he databases showed a total of 116 events (33 related to cracks
nd 83 to leaks). Three main causes for failure were identiﬁed,
amely, fatigue, corrosion and the presence of manufacturing
efects. Human factor induced defects proved to have little impact
 less than 10% of the cases could be attributed to operation errors.
atigue was found being induced by several factors: excessive
ibration, pressure shocks and the thermal regime of operating the
ipe, as well as by combinations of these factors. Corrosion was
nduced, in most of the cases, by a non-appropriate choice of alloys
hile not taking into account the chemical parameters of the ﬂuid
nside pipes. Manufacturing defects mostly dealt with welding and Design 275 (2014) 163–167 165
related problems and deviation from the design documentation
during post-weld heat treatment.
4.2. Reactor pressure vessel and pressuriser
Screening the databases revealed a total of 66 events (7 related
to cracks and 59 to leaks) involving the reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) and the pressuriser. The main cause of failure identiﬁed was
corrosion. The events dealing with corrosion pointed to various
causes, like steam impingement, high oxygen concentration, or
use of materials containing water-soluble chlorides (asbestos) as
an insulation material. 9 of all the 66 events selected were found
dealing with inadequate material selection (mainly alloy 600). For
example, all of the six events involving RPV head penetrations
recorded into the SAPIDE database were related to the vulnerability
of Inconel 600 to stress corrosion cracking.
Other events were caused by the following deﬁciencies: devi-
ation from modern design recommendations, inadequacy of the
detailed written procedures, improper process of manual electric
arc welding, debris on the vessel ﬂange and post weld heat treat-
ment at the manufacturer’s works. Lack of feedback from operating
experience was also detected in some events.
4.3. Steam generator (SG) tubes
Screening the databases resulted in 88 events (14 related to
cracks and 74 to leaks) involving SGs. The main cause of the SG
tube defects was  corrosion. It was  found that corrosion was induced
mainly by improper material selection (mainly alloy 600), and just
in few cases by design deﬁciencies. A second important contributor
represents the manufacturing defects, mainly resulted as failures
of the Quality Assurance (QA) programme implemented during the
fabrication process.
Some events showed that a circumferential through-wall crack-
ing can occur with a rapid degradation kinetic. In French PWRs,
the tubes material varies depending on the year of construction,
so the following tubes are found, respectively: “Inconel 600 MA”
(Mill Annealed) tubes, “Inconel 600 HT” (Heat-Treated) tubes, and
“Inconel 690 HT” (Heat-Treated) tubes. “Inconel 600” and, in par-
ticular, “Inconel 600 MA,” are susceptible to stress corrosion, which
leads to cracking. For the period 1990–2010, the French operators
reported 31 events involving a primary-to-secondary leak rate that
was excessive with reference to the thresholds and limits deﬁned
in the technical operating speciﬁcations.
4.4. Reactor coolant pumps
Screening the databases revealed 29 events (5 related to cracks
and 24 to leaks) dealing with reactor coolant pumps. The events
recorded into the IRS database were related to inadequate seal
design (upper rotating seal ring degradation/failure was  the fail-
ure mode), to inadequate inspection method, to foreign substance
intrusion into reactor coolant during operation and/or mainte-
nance, and to the fact that damages on the seal water injection
line ﬁlters could lead to clogging downstream of the seal housing.
19 events were recorded into the French national database alone.
By their classiﬁcation, there were:
• Events involving damage to dynamic seals and leakage into the
nuclear island vent and drain system (or into the reactor contain-
ment),• Events involving external leakage from a static seal,
• Events involving lack or loss of screws or bolts tension and gener-
alised corrosion in screws and bolts contributing to maintaining
the integrity of the second containment barrier (with said lack or
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loss of tension causing borated water leaks which in turn result
in generalised corrosion),
Events involving inadvertent interruption of coolant ﬂow in the
thermal barrier, followed by subsequent damage, events involv-
ing damage to the backseat seal, followed by leakage into the
nuclear island vent and drain system (or into the reactor con-
tainment),
One event involving external leakage from a temperature sensor
and
One event involving incorrect installation of seal no. 1.
.5. Safety relief valves
Screening the databases revealed 18 events (2 related to cracks
nd 16 to leaks) involving safety relief valves. The events in the IRS
atabase were related to the safety relief valves installed on the
ressuriser (6 events). The analysis of French national database was
imited to the safety relief valves (protection and isolation) installed
n the pressuriser of the French PWRs. The analysis only retained
vents characterised by a failure or leak affecting the relief valve
andems of the pressuriser (valve, control cabinet and connections).
he result of screening the French national database shows 8 events
nvolving safety relief valves, of which 4 events involved “Banjo”
tting and/or “Jet” seal failures.
Screening the German national database identiﬁed three events
nvolving safety relief valves, all of them occurred at BWRs. The ﬁrst
vent was caused by a malfunction of testing equipment whereas
he second one was caused due to degradation of a control relay
 both of them were leaks. The third safety relief valve event had
s cause a broken spring, which was detected during revision, but
id not lead to a leakage. The main causes for the German events
ere, apart for human errors, periodic inspection programme deﬁ-
iencies and spurious actuation, in combination with minor design
eﬁciencies.
All these events underline the importance of instrumentation
n and surrounding the relief valves and control cabinets, and their
ssociated measurements and alarms.
.6. Isolation and control valves
There were found a total of 65 events (7 related to cracks and 58
o leaks) in the databases involving these types of valves. Screening
RS database revealed that 5 of the 12 events dealt with main-
enance induced corrosion, while corrosion alone caused just 2
vents. Regarding the US NRC database, it was found that 4 out of
he 6 recorded events dealt with manufacturing defects, caused in
alf of the cases by design deﬁciencies. By far, the highest number
f events is recorded in the SAPIDE database. The events observed
oncern internal (upstream-downstream) and external (packing)
eaks that were collected into tank or systems.
Of 14 events involving packing gland failure, six involved pres-
uriser spray valves. Screening the KomPass database revealed a
otal of 7 events involving valves. Out of them, 6 events occurred
t BWRs, and were caused by corrosion. Although usually there are
everal causal factors that cause the events, for the purpose of this
tudy it was investigated the proportion of events caused by fail-
re of manual operated valves in events. This examination revealed
3 events, recorded in all 4 databases, involving manual operated
alves. So, manual operated valves inﬂict a large share of leaks.
.7. FlangesThe ﬂange joints and mechanical connections are mainly found
n small-diameter pipes (instrumentation, venting and drain) and
n the auxiliary pipes connected to the RCS. The leaks in the ﬂange
oints often are characterised by a slow ﬂow rate and by damage and Design 275 (2014) 163–167
localised in the seal. The observations of leaks (boron deposits), are
often followed by the replacement of the seal.
Screening the databases revealed 24 events dealing with ﬂanges
(1 related to cracks and 23 to leaks). Diverse causes were identiﬁed.
It was  found that the “O” rings used by the manufacturers were
slightly oversized, so could not be contained inside the groove and
was swelling outward under pressure. Other causes for leak were
the lack of QA during maintenance and staff training, the utilisation
of materials sensitive to intergranular and transgranular stress cor-
rosion cracking on the ﬂange contact surfaces and deﬁciencies in
the installation procedures.
5. Discussion
All the 409 events analysed involving cracking or leakage of
reactor coolant have different root causes or sources. In more cases,
the events did not have just one cause, but a combination of them.
The causes of the analysed events are the following:
• Corrosion of different types for 35% of the cases.
• Manufacturing defect (e.g., ferritic pollution of stainless steel) for
15% of the cases.
• Maintenance anomaly (e.g., improperly placed seal, insufﬁcient
torque, etc.) for 11% of the cases.
• Control or operating error (e.g., manual valve in inappropriate
open position or in incompletely closed position, etc.) for 9% of
the cases.
• Fatigue for 11% of the cases
• Unknown or other causes in 19% of the cases.
Fig. 4 lists the degradation mechanisms that may  be present in
the different components of the RCPB, see (IAEA, 2005; GALL, 2010;
IGALL, 2014). Not all these mechanisms were found in the analy-
sis of events due to the limited number of events in the databases.
Corrosion is the main root cause of the events analysed. In France,
many corrosion induced events are due to Inconel 600 (SG tubes
and vessel head penetrations). If we  do not take into account these
events, which are numerous, corrosion is not the main degrada-
tion mechanism. In France, corrosion is often a consequence of an
external leak (boric acid).
Manufacturing defects are the second largest root cause. These
events are nearly all related to welding faults, but also it could
be founded cases in which the manufacturing defect was just
the “apparent cause”, while it’s precursors were dealing with
inappropriate QA measures at the manufacturer. Fatigue is also
an important degradation mechanism for the analysed events.
Both mechanical fatigue and thermal fatigue were identiﬁed dur-
ing the analysis. Mechanical fatigue appeared in certain cases in
combination with another cause, like manufacturing or mainte-
nance defects, especially on welds. Thermal fatigue usually appears
mainly in conjunction with “Farley–Tihange” phenomenon, but
also could be triggered by high temperature differences from one
side to the other of a tube, for example.
The event investigation showed that the crack and leak related
events occurred in speciﬁc equipment, components or sensitive
areas. SG tubes; SG nozzle dams and associated drain plugs required
and operated during outages; reactor vessel head penetration
areas; small lines for bypass, instrumentation, venting and drainage
and corresponding isolation valves; RCS pumps; RCS relief valves
and associated control cabinets; valve housings; all the lines, com-
ponents and accessories located in such areas where they are
exposed to various hazards and quality failures during outages
when manual operations are required; ﬂange joints and their seals,
as well the mechanical couplings or ﬁttings, in particular those
subject to frequent operating or maintenance interventions.
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Report of the European Clearinghouse on NPP Operational Experience FeedbackFig. 4. Degradation mechanisms affec
The assessment performed shows that cracks have a low safety
mpact – all the leaks were discovered with the plant in cold shut-
own, by performing inspection, and their effect on operation was
lmost negligible. Besides, it was observed that when a crack is dis-
overed, the operators take the needed precautionary measures to
imit or to control the propagation of the crack – usually the cracks
iscovered during power operation are repaired during the next
utage. The mechanism of cracks development varies from case to
ase, based on the type of the plant and on the type of operation
nd/or maintenance of the equipment. Regarding the cracks only,
t was found that fatigue (both mechanical and thermal) was  the
ain contributor to the appearance of cracks – for the other cases
geing, corrosion or combinations of these three contributors were
he initiating stressors of the systems, structures and components
ffected.
Contrary to cracks, once detected the leaks usually request for an
mmediate action. The OEF analysis indicates that leaks often have
 signiﬁcant safety impact, mainly on staff radiation protection, as
sually decontamination and cleaning operation require numerous
uman resources to enter controlled areas. Also, leaks can induce
orrosion of base materials and of external surfaces of the pressure
oundary, i.e., vessel head had to be cleaned several times because
f boron deposits. Leaks also induced production of unaccounted
astes that must be treated according to the waste management
lans. Some leaks were difﬁcult to detect, to locate and to stop.
. Conclusions
Event reporting has become an increasingly important aspect of
he operation and regulation of all public health and safety related
ndustries. Diverse industries such as aeronautics, chemicals,
harmaceuticals and nuclear all depend on operating experience
eedback to provide lessons learned about safety. For events involv-
ng failures in operating devices or in human and organisational
erformance, it is important to analyse the event, to identify its
auses and draw lessons, in order to avoid the recurrence of similar
vents or to ensure with additional defences that their conse-
uences remain small.
Numerous recommendations have been elaborated in the anal-
sis of the cracks and leaks related events and are extensively
ocumented in (Renev et al., 2014). The analysis was performed
rom different perspectives. Only a summary of the methodology
sed and some relevant results are presented in this paper.CPB components. From Seifert (2007).
Plant operating experience has shown that signiﬁcant increases
in the leakage rates below the limits established in the plant tech-
nical speciﬁcations, but above the baseline values, may  indicate a
potentially adverse condition. Plants should periodically analyse
the trend in the unidentiﬁed and identiﬁed leakage rates. Evaluat-
ing the increase in the leakage rates is important to verifying that
the plant will continue to operate within acceptable limits. Prompt
corrective action requires continuous online monitoring for leak-
age, which is important to ensuring the safe operation of a facility
because it provides an indicator during reactor operation that a
potentially adverse condition may  exist.
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